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ABSTRACT
The present research was conducted in order to in­
vestigate the influence of role (actor/observer) and 
three situational variables on the attribution process.
One hundred twenty male subjects were run in pairs and 
served as both actor and observer of the experimental 
task which was answering 30 spatial visualization prob­
lems. Two console panels were employed for the actor to 
make his responses to the problems and to provide pre­
programmed feedback to both the actor and observer as to 
whether or not the actor had responded correctly.
The results indicated that when subjects are involved 
in novel situations, whether they are performing the un­
familiar task or observing another perform it, their 
attributions are significantly influenced by a primacy 
effect for feedback of success. It was also found that 
when subjects willingly involve themselves in situations 
which they know beforehand may result in negative out­
comes and feel that their actions are capable of directly 
influencing the outcome, they will accept responsibility 
for such negative outcomes rather than making external 
attributions to explain such occurrences. The final major 
finding was that the self interest of observers was 
capable of exerting a significant influence upon the 
directionality (external/internal) of their attributions.
vii
The relevance of these findings to the divergent attribu­
tion hypothesis and other attribution research were dis­
cussed and potential applications of the major findings of 
the present study to training situations were explored.
viii
INTRODUCTION
In general, theories of attribution deal with the 
processes whereby people ascribe intentions, traits, 
feelings, and characteristics to other persons in their 
social environment. Attribution theories also attempt to 
account for the way in which people formulate causal 
interpretations of the events which occur in their 
environment. Heider (1958) has suggested that the attri­
bution process entails one's interpretation of events as 
"...being caused by particular parts of the relatively 
stable environment." Kanhouse and Hanson (1972) have 
indicated that the attribution process serves to further 
the individual's need to make sense of the world around 
him. A person thus makes both causal and descriptive 
inferences to accomplish this aim.
The attribution of traits may serve not only to 
describe the people with whom one interacts but also to 
explain their behavior. Attribution is thus a self 
serving process performed in order to understand the con­
tents of our environment. The process itself involves an 
analysis of causality by means of which one decides which 
effects are to be attributed to which of several potential 
causal factors available. Kelly (1967, 1971, 1972) has 
suggested that the attribution process involves one's 
application of his knowledge of causal relations among
1
2persons and events in order to exercise control over his 
environment.
Jones and Nisbett (1972) have examined the attribu­
tion process from the perspective of both the actor, the 
person performing the task, and the observer, the person 
witnessing the behavior. These authors have noted a 
widespread tendency for the attributions of actors to 
differ considerably from those of observers. Jones and 
Nisbett (1972) have suggested that "...there is a pervasive 
tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situa­
tional requirements whereas observers tend to attribute 
the same actions to stable personal dispositions" (p. 80). 
A number of experimental studies have been cited by Jones 
and Nisbett in support of their position.
Because of the methodology employed, the study re­
ported by Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals, and Ward (196 8) 
is of crucial importance to the present experiment. A 
series of six experiments was conducted in order to study 
the effects of varying feedback patterns of success and 
failure on attributions of intellectual ability. In each 
experiment, the same series of extremely difficult test 
items were employed as a supposed measure of intelligence. 
In the first four experiments subjects were informed that 
they had correctly answered 10 randomly distributed items 
and that a stimulus person (SP), whose performance they 
had observed, had correctly answered 15 of the 30 test
3items in a pattern wherein: a) correct responses were
randomly distributed among the 30 items; b) correct 
responses were concentrated primarily in the first portion 
of the test; or c) correct responses were concentrated 
towards the end of the test. In the fifth experiment 
only the ascending and descending patterns of correct 
responses were utilized. It was found that observer 
subjects in the descending success conditions rated their 
SPs as more intelligent than SPs in the two other condi­
tions. The observers also predicted that SPs in the 
descending condition would perform better on a future 
similar test and favorably distorted recall of the de­
scending SPs performance on the test (Jones, et al., 1968).
In the sixth experiment a subject and an SP simul­
taneously solved the test items and received feedback 
after each response. However the patterns were reversed 
so that the accomplice (SP) attained a random pattern of 
ten correct responses, whereas the subject learned that 
he had answered 15 of the 30 items in a random, ascending, 
or descending pattern of responses. A second series of 
items was then administered and subjects recorded their 
answers to each item plus a prediction of whether their 
partner would respond to the item correctly (Jones, et al., 
1968).
The ascending success subjects predicted better per­
formance for themselves on the second series than either
4the random or descending feedback subjects. In all con­
ditions subjects were able to accurately remember their 
patterns of success and failure on the first test without 
distortion and could also accurately recall their partner's 
response patterns. It was also found that subjects did 
not re-evaluate their own intelligence as a result of 
their performance on the first test although ascending 
subjects made self attributions of higher motivation 
levels than did descending subjects. Despite the fact 
that the experimental instructions emphasized that all 
items were of equal difficulty, ascending subjects re­
ported that the items in the latter portion of the series 
were of less difficulty than those in the initial posi­
tion and descending subjects felt that item difficulty 
varied in the reverse direction. Thus when subjects were 
focusing on their own actions there was a greater tendency 
to ascribe performance fluctuation to changes in item 
difficulty than when subjects were observing the actions 
of another person in the earlier experiments (Jones, 
et al., 1968) .
Jones and Nisbett (1972) have also cited studies 
wherein: a) subjects were presented with written
descriptions of actions performed by other persons and 
asked to make causal attributions with respect to those 
behaviors (McArthur, 1970; 1972); b) subjects attributed 
causality for positions advocated by others in essays
5(Jones and Harris, 1967; Nisbett and Caputo, 1971); and 
c) actors and observers made causal attributions for the 
actor's behavior (Nisbett, Legant, and Marecek, 1971). 
According to Jones and Nisbett (19 72), these studies have 
supported the position that actors tend to ascribe the 
causes of their behavior to external situational factors 
whereas observers attribute that same behavior to internal 
dispositions on the part of the actor.
An experiment conducted by Storms (1973) was of 
importance with respect to actor/observer differences in 
attribution because in addition to supporting the Jones 
and Nisbett (19 72) position, it identified a method of 
upsetting the basic directionality of actor/observer 
attributions. The effects of altering visual perspectives 
by means of videotape replays of actors and observers was 
investigated. Two actor subjects engaged in a brief "get 
acquainted" conversation which was witnessed by two ob­
server subjects, then both actors and observers made 
causal attributions about the actor's behavior during the 
conversation. Visual orientation was manipulated by re­
playing videotapes of the behavior before the subjects 
completed the attribution questionnaires. When subjects 
either saw no videotape replay or saw one that merely 
repeated their original visual orientation, the actors 
tended to make situational attributions. The observers, 
on the other hand, made primarily internal dispositional
6attributions to the actors to explain the behavior 
witnessed. Actors who watched a videotape replay which 
focused on their own behavior were less situational and 
more dispositional in their attributions of their be­
havior. Observers who viewed a video tape of the other 
participant with whom the actors had conversed attri­
buted the actors1 behavior more to situational external 
factors than to internal dispositional factors of the 
actor. Thus a reversal of actors’ and observers' visual 
perspectives via video tape feedback resulted in a re­
versal in the directionality of their respective attribu­
tions (Storms, 1973).
These findings were interpreted as support for the 
Jones and Nisbett (19 72) position and it was suggested 
that a major reason for this attributional orientation is 
the different visual perspectives of the actors and ob­
servers regarding the behavior under consideration.
Results reported by Synder and Jones (1974) have 
identified yet another method of upsetting the directional­
ity of the actor/observer attribution processes, namely, 
increasing the salience of the situational constraints on 
the observed behavior. A series of five experiments was 
conducted in which subjects made attitude attributions 
based on opinion statements of others which had been 
written under high constraints. In the first experiment 
subjects wrote pro-marijuana or pro-Castro essays. Half
7the subjects were given arguments that could be included 
in their essays and half received no such "priming".
Upon completion of the essays, subjects who had written 
pro-Castro essays read pro-marijuana essays and vice 
versa. Subjects were informed of whether the essay they 
were to read had been "primed" or not. Regardless of 
whether the essays were identified as "primed" or not 
primed, subjects attributed attitudes to the writer which 
were consistent with those expressed in the essay. In 
the second experiment, instead of both writing and 
reading the essays, subjects merely read them although 
they were still informed of the primed or unprimed 
character of the essays. The results were identical to 
those of the first experiment.
The third experiment (Synder and Jones, 1974) was 
conducted to investigate the possibility that being 
assigned to write an essay on one topic doesn't alert the 
writer to the constraints on someone assigned to write on 
another topic. In this experiment all subjects wrote and 
read pro-Castro essays. In addition to the dependent 
measures employed in the earlier experiments, the subjects 
were also asked to indicate whether the essay writer was 
allowed to choose or was assigned the topic. The results 
indicated that although the subjects had been assigned 
the same essay topic as the target person, they still 
attributed attitudes consistent with those in the essays
8to the target persons.
In the fourth experiment (Synder and Jones, 1974) 
subjects both wrote and read pro and con essays about 
the legalization of abortion. All subjects were assigned 
the positions advocated in the essays. For both groups 
of subjects, run in separate rooms, half were assigned 
a prolegalization position and half an antilegalization 
position. Essays were then exchanged between rooms, 
each subject receiving and reading an essay advocating 
the same position that his essay had supported. The 
instructions, which indicated the writer's lack of choice 
in selecting the position advocated, were attached to 
easy essay. As in the earlier experiments, subjects 
attributed attitudes to the writers that were consistent 
with the position advocated in the essays.
In the final experiment, subjects were not only 
assigned the position to be advocated, pro- or anti- free 
federal medical care, but also were instructed to in­
corporate specific arguments into their essays. In addi­
tion, one group of subjects was allowed to chose which 
side, pro or con, of the issue to support. Each subject 
read an essay written by another subject whose essay 
assignment was the same as the reader's. All readers 
were informed of the exact conditions under which the 
essays had been written. The results indicated that as 
the constraints on the actor's behavior became more
9salient, e.g. the reader was informed that the writer 
had no choice in selecting the position advocated and 
was required to use specific arguments in writing the 
essay, their impact on the actor becomes recognized by 
the observer as a casual factor influencing the behavior. 
In terms of the Jones and Nisbett (1972) position, the 
increased emphasis on the situational factors caused the 
observers to shift from attributing behavior to internal 
dispositions of the actor to perceiving the external 
situational factors as responsible for the behavior.
A study by Worchel and Andreoli (1974) reported 
findings that were contrary to the Jones and Nisbett 
(1972) position. Their study investigated the influence 
of a norm of reciprocity on the attribution process. The 
norm of reciprocity was elicited during the initial inter­
action between the subject and a confederate. While 
waiting for a second subject (actually a confederate) to 
arrive the subject was requested to alphabetize a stack 
of answer sheets. In the friendly condition, the con­
federate arrived and offered assistance. In the un­
friendly condition, the confederate did not offer to 
help and stated, "Boy, that’s a dumb thing to do. They 
can get some people to do anything in these experiments."
Locus of causality was manipulated by having the 
experimenter tell the subject that the other subject's 
(confederate's) behavior (helped/did not help) had been
10
predicted by a personality test which she had taken at 
the beginning of the experiment. In this manner, the 
experimenter emphasized that the reasons for the con­
federate's behavior were internal and not a result of 
situational factors (forced attribution condition). In 
the free-attribution condition no reference to behavioral 
predictions based on personality tests was made.
The findings (Worchel and Andreoli, 1974) were con­
trary to predictions based on the Jones and Nisbett 
(1972) position. Subjects in the free attribution con­
dition ascribed causality for the confederate's behavior 
to situational factors and not to internal dispositions 
of the actor. This direction of causal attributions was 
more pronounced when future interaction with the con­
federate was anticipated.
In this experiment subjects in all conditions experi­
enced the reciprocity invoking manipulation. It is 
plausible that the norm of reciprocity influenced the 
subjects to diverge from the usual mode of attribution, 
i.e. that proposed by Jones and Nisbett (1972), in order 
to serve their own self interest by not placing con­
straints on any future interactions with the other person. 
Thus, the findings (Worchel and Andreoli, 1974) may be 
interpreted not as having refuted the hypothesis of Jones 
and Nisbett (19 72) with respect to actor versus observer 
attributions, but rather as having identified a variable,
11
the reciprocity norm, which had the effect of altering 
the attribution process.
Several other studies have reported results which 
suggest that self interest exercises an effect on the 
attribution process employed by subjects to explain their 
behavior. In an investigation dealing with attributions 
of responsibility for particular outcomes (Harvey and 
Harris, 1975), subjects were designated "decision makers" 
and were requested to select one of two experimental 
tasks to be performed by another subject at a later time. 
The "decision makers" were given only ambiguous informa­
tion describing the two tasks but were afforded either a 
difficult or an easy opportunity to obtain clarification 
of the precise nature of the tasks. The situation was one 
in which a student (confederate) who was unfamiliar with 
the tasks was supposedly substituting for the regular 
experimenter. The student substitute indicated that al­
though he was unable to clarify the highly technical 
written descriptions of the tasks which the subject 
received the regular experimenter would be able to do so. 
In the easy opportunity condition, the subject was told 
that the experimenter was in another room in the building. 
In the difficult opportunity condition he was described 
as being in another building across campus. The con­
federate told the subjects that he would wait for them 
if they wanted to go and get clarification from the
12
experimenter. After making the decision without seeking 
additional information, the regular experimenter entered 
the room and provided explicit information about the task 
which the subject had selected. Half the subjects were 
led to believe that the task was very pleasant and the 
other half learned that it was very unpleasant.
Subjects who learned that their decision would lead 
to pleasant consequences for another person attributed 
greater responsibility for the outcome to themselves than 
did subjects who were informed that the consequences would 
be unpleasant. It was found that in the unpleasant con­
sequence conditions subjects who had received an easy 
opportunity to gain additional information attributed less 
responsibility to themselves than did subjects who were 
offered the difficult opportunity. It was suggested that 
attribution of responsibility is made in a manner con­
sistent with the self interest of the attributor (Harvey 
and Harris, 1975). Similar findings with respect to the 
influence of self interest on attributions of 
responsibility have been reported in a number of recent 
studies (Johnson, Feigenbaum, and Weiby, 1964; Beckman,
19 7 C; Harvey, Harris, and Barnes, 1975).
However, not all the research reported dealing with 
the influence of self interest on attributions of 
responsibility has yielded consistent results. Ross, 
Biecbrauer, and Polly (1974) conducted an experiment in
13
which professional teachers and college students in­
structed an 11 year old boy (a confederate) in spelling. 
The subjects were separated from the confederate by a one 
way mirror. Subjects were informed via worksheets that 
the pupil had either done exceptionally well or had done 
very poorly. The subject's teaching performance and 
its apparent outcome (success/failure) were witnessed by 
observers. Contrary to earlier findings (Johnson, 
Feigenbaum, and Weiby, 1964; Beckman, 1970), instructors 
rated their own efforts and abilities as less important 
than those of the student in the success condition and 
as more important in the failure condition. This direc­
tion of attribution was more pronounced among the pro­
fessional teachers than among the undergraduate subjects. 
Comparison of attributions made by instructors and ob­
servers were not statistically significant. Observers 
also saw the instructor as more responsible for failure 
than for success. None of the subject groups (observers, 
professional teachers, non-professionals) attributed 
responsibility for failure to the student nor did any 
group of subjects attribute responsibility for success 
to the instructor.
Another variable which may influence the attribution 
orocess is the operation of "chance" or "luck" in 
determining the outcomes of one's behavior. In an in­
vestigation of observer's and actor's reactions to the
14
actor's receipt of chance outcomes subjects were informed 
that the experiment would consist of two five minute 
periods during which the actors would be required to make 
constructions with a magnetic play kit (Apsler and 
Friedman, 1975). The first period was conducted without 
positive or negative consequences. Upon conclusion of 
the first period, the experimenter took a photograph of 
the construction supposedly to be judged later by another 
group of subjects and then informed the actor that she 
had been assigned to the reward/no reward condition. The 
reward consisted of an extra hour of credit whereas the 
punishment was no extra credit. Actors and observers 
received instructions that were intentionally ambiguous 
in describing the method of assigning subjects to the 
reward/no reward conditions. Upon assignment of the 
reward both actors and observers who had witnessed the 
actors' performances and heard the condition to which she 
was assigned, completed the questionnaires that served 
as the dependent measures.
Observers rated the rewarded actors' performances 
significantly higher than the non-rewarded actors' per­
formances. The rewarded actors were also seen as more 
"good" than were the non-rewarded actors. The outcome 
manipulation was also found to affect the actors' ratings 
of their own performances. Rewarded actors rated their 
performances higher than did non-rewarded actors. In
15
addition, non-rewarded actors did not attribute their out­
comes to chance any more than rewarded recipients did 
(Apsler and Friedman, 1975). These findings were contrary 
to the position advocated by Jones and Nisbett (1972) 
concerning attribution differences between actors and 
observers insofar as there was no evidence that actors 
attributed the outcome to situational factors or that ob­
servers attributed it to the actors.
These findings (Apsler and Friedman, 1975) however, 
may be interpreted as support for the position that the 
divergent attributions of actors and observers advocated 
by Jones and Nisbett (1972) are capable of being altered 
by manipulating the consequences of the behavior under 
consideration. Both actors and observers were informed 
that the actor, after having performed the task for five 
minutes, had been assigned to either a reward or no reward 
condition. This was the final bit of information communi­
cated to both observers and actors before they completed 
the questionnaire which served as the dependent measure. 
Under such conditions, both actors and observers rated 
the actor's task performance more positively when she was 
rewarded than when no reward was received. This finding 
was interpreted as supporting Lerner's "just world" 
hypothesis which, in essence, maintains that people get 
what they deserve and deserve what they get. Lerner 
(1965) found that randomly assigned rewards influence
16
observers' perceptions of another's performance in such a 
manner that the performance of rewarded workers was seen 
as superior to that of unrewarded workers.
In addition, the prediction that actors would tend to 
attribute the assignment of reward/no reward to external 
factors whereas observers would attribute the assignment 
to the actors' performances was not supported. Instead, 
it was found that 20% of both observers and actors in­
dicated that the basis for assignment of the reward/no 
reward condition was the actor's performance whereas 62% 
of the observers and 47% of the actors believed that the 
assignment was randomly determined (Apsler and Friedman, 
1975). Such results suggest that increasing the saliency 
of the consequences of one's behavior exerts an influence 
on the attribution processes employed by both actors and 
observers with respect to the performance of that behavior.
In summary, the preponderance of the research evidence 
to date indicates that the Jones and Nisbett (1972) posi­
tion is essentially correct with respect to the basic 
modes of attribution employed by actors and observers.
The research further suggests that the actor/observer 
attribution processes may be altered by increasing the 
salience of particular aspects of the behavioral situa­
tion. Studies which reported results contrary to the 
Jones and Nisbett (1972) position (Worchel and Andreoli, 
1974; Apsler and Friedman, 1975; and Ross, Bierbrauer,
17
and Polly, 1974) may be interpreted as having identified 
factors which are capable of "upsetting" the basic 
directionality of actor/observer attributions.
The vast majority of the experimental situations 
employed to investigate the Jones and Nisbett (1972) 
hypothesis did not assess the respective attributions of 
subjects in both actor and observer roles. Instead, 
these studies focused on attributions of subjects who 
served as actors or as observers. In addition a number 
of the studies reported used observers who based their 
attributions on written descriptions of another's actions 
rather than on actual observations of the behavior.
The -^resent experiment was conducted in order to 
provide a more accurate assessment of the influence of 
role on the attribution process. This was accomplished 
by collecting attribution data from each subject function­
ing in both actor and observer roles involving the same 
behavioral situation. This was done in order to test the 
Jones and Nisbett (1972) hypothesis that the directional­
ity of attributions is a function of the role of the 
attributor. Such a procedure enabled the potency of the 
effect of role upon the attribution processes of individual 
subjects, functioning as both actors and observers, to be 
ascertained more clearly than in any previous research.
An additional purpose of the experiment was to identify 
further the effects of a number of situational factors
18
on the actor/observer divergent attribution hypothesis 
(Jones and Nisbett, 1972). Another purpose of the study 
was to replicate the earlier findings of Jones, et al., 
1968.
The present research investigated the effects of 
role, reward, feedback of correct responses, and future 
consequences on the attribution process. The seven 
dependent variables that assessed the attribution process 
were responsibility for reward allocations, ability, 
motivation, liking for the other subject, performance, 
task difficulty, and expected future performance.
At the outset of the experiment an ambiguous situa­
tion was created wherein both subjects participated in 
determining the amount of research credit they received 
for performing the task. This enabled the reward variable 
to be experimentally manipulated. Subjects were then 
required to solve a number of spatial problems presented 
via a slide projector. Each subject served as both actor 
and observer. This constituted the role variable manipula­
tion. Responses were made by pushing the appropriate 
buttons on a specially designed console panel which pro­
vided immediate feedback as to the correctness of the 
responses to both actor and observer.
Two patterns of success feedback were employed. In 
the ascending pattern the majority of correct responses 
were concentrated in the latter portion of the problems.
19
In the descending pattern the correct responses clustered 
primarily in the initial half of the problems. Future 
consequences were manipulated by either informing the 
subjects that they would be given the opportunity to work 
as a team in solving similar problems at a future date in 
competition with other teams for a large financial reward 
or by informing them that they would both merely be re­
quired to perform the task with no mention of any future 
interaction. A control condition was also employed where­
in consequences and reward were held constant.
Upon completion of the task both actors and observers 
filled out a questionnaire dealing with the seven 
dependent variables used to assess the attribution pro­
cess. Subjects recall of the actor’s performance and pre­
dictions of his future performance on a similar task were 
also ascertained.
A number of hypotheses regarding the effect of the 
particular variables upon the attribution processes were 
tested:
I. Role
Based on the theoretical position of Jones and Nisbett 
(1972) and the experimental results reported by Jones 
and Harris (1967) it was hypothesized that:
A. In situations wherein reward and future inter­
actions are not manipulated actors would tend to 
make external attributions to explain their
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II.
behavior whereas observers would tend to explain 
that same behavior by making internal disposi­
tional attributions to the actor.
B. When situational factors such as high reward are 
combined with ascending feedback patterns of 
success, attributions of actors will be more 
internal than when such situational factors are 
not manipulated.
C. Role, i.e. actor/observer, will exert a more pro­
found influence on the attribution processes of 
subjects than will their immediate past experi­
ence . Thus:
1. First and second order actors should demonstrate 
similar attributions in the same experimental 
conditions.
2. First and second order observers should 
demonstrate similar attributions under the 
same experimental conditions.
Situational Factors
A. Reward Outcomes:
1. Based upon results reported by Johnson,
Feigenbaum, and Weiby (1964), Beckman (1970), 
and Harris and Harvey (1975) , it was hypothe­
sized that when both subjects interact in 
Producing an outcome (high/low reward) 
attributions of responsibility will be
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governed by self interest. Positive (high 
reward) outcomes will be attributed primarily 
to oneself by both subjects whereas negative 
(low reward) outcomes will be attributed to 
the other person.
2. Based upon the theoretical position of Lerner 
(1965) and the experimental results reported 
by Apsler and Friedman (1975), it was hypothe­
sized that both actors and observers would 
make more positive attributions (other than 
for responsibility) under high reward con­
ditions .
B. Feedback of Success: Based on the theoretical
position of Jones and Nisbett (1972) and the 
experimental results reported by Jones, et al. 
(1968) it was hypothesized that:
1. An ascending pattern of success would be 
perceived by observers as indicative of lower 
ability and poorer performance on the part of 
the actor than similar attributions made by 
observers witnessing a descending pattern of 
successes.
2. This pattern of attributions would be reversed 
when actors are reflecting upon their own 
behavior.
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C. Future Consequences: Based on the findings of
Worchel and Andreoli (1974) it was hypothesized 
that the prospect of future interaction for the 
purpose of gaining a large financial reward 
would influence observers' attributions in 
accordance with self interest. Thus they would 
emphasize situational factors in making causal 
attributions to explain the actor’s behavior when 
that behavior was perceived as poor and emphasize 
internal factors when the actor's performance was 
perceived positively.
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects were 120 male undergraduates enrolled in an 
introductory psychology course at Louisiana State Univer­
sity who volunteered to participate in the experiment for 
additional course credit. All subjects were run in pairs 
by a male experimenter.
Apparatus
A slide projector was used to present 30 spatial 
problems to the subject. Each problem consisted of an 
array of three spatial stimulus arrangements, in which 
the relationship among components was systematically 
varied from one arrangement to the next, and four spatial 
arrangements, lettered A through D, from which the subject 
selected the one that would correctly complete the 
sequence. The problems were constructed in such a manner 
that there was no obviously correct solution to any of 
them. A total of 60 such slides, subdivided into two 30 
item presentations, was employed. The slides were pre­
sented automatically at a constant exposure time of 20 
seconds.
Two specially designed console panels were utilized 
for the actor to select his answers and to provide feed­
back of the correctness of the response to both actors
and observers. The actor console consisted of a row of
23
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six alternate red and green lights which horizontally- 
spanned the face of the console. A row of toggle 
switches, numbered one through 30, corresponding to the 
problems, was located three and one half inches directly 
below the row of lights. A second row of four buttons, 
lettered A through D, was located three and one quarter 
inches below, and centered on, the row of 30 numbered 
toggle switches. Operation of the actor console involved 
flipping the numbered switch, corresponding to the 
stimulus presented, and simultaneously depressing the 
lettered button indicating the answer selected. Depress­
ing the buttons in this fashion illuminated either the 
red or the green lights for the particular problem to 
which the subject was responding. Illumination of a red 
light indicated that the response was incorrect whereas 
a green light meant that the correct response had been 
made. Once pressure was removed from the buttons, the 
light immediately extinguished. The actor console was 
designed so that by means of a gang switch the illumina­
tion pattern of red and green lights could be programmed. 
Two such programs, both consisting of fifteen green and 
fifteen red illuminations, were employed. In the ascending 
program green light illuminations were concentrated 
primarily in the latter half of the 30 responses, whereas 
this pattern was reversed in the descending program.
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Fig. 1. Feedback patterns employed in ascending and 
descending conditions.
The observer console differed from the actor console 
in that it contained no response buttons although the rows 
of feedback lights were identical to those on the actor 
console. The two consoles were wired so that a feedback 
light which was illuminated on the actor console was 
simultaneously lit on the observer console. When the light 
extinguished on the actor console it also extinguished on 
the observer console. In this manner both actor and 
observer simultaneously received feedback as to the 
correctness of the actor's responses.
The experimental apparatus also included a canister 
containing six ping pong balls each marked with the number 
"three" or "one" which was used to determine the subject's 
reward for participating in the experiment. A wooden 
partition was also employed to screen actors from ob­
servers during the conduct of the experiment. The slides 
were projected on a 4' by 6' screen.
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The two consoles were mounted on tables separated 
by the partition so that both subjects, when seated at 
the tables, were facing the screen. The problems were 
presented on the screen via a slide projector located mid­
way between the tables. Thus subjects were situated 
such that both viewed the problems and their respective 
console panels although, because of the partition, 
neither subject could see the other.
Two questionnaires were utilized to assess the 
effects of the environmental manipulations on the subjects' 
attribution processes. The only difference between the 
two questionnaires was that one contained two items 
which assessed the degree of responsibility for the reward 
outcome which subjects attributed to themselves and to the 
other person. This questionnaire was completed by sub­
jects in the reward conditions. The other questionnaire 
did not contain any items concerning responsibility for 
reward and was completed by subjects in the standard re­
ward conditions. Except for this difference, the two 
questionnaires were identical insofar as they assessed 
the subjects' attributions of ability, performance, luck, 
effort, problem difficulty, and attractiveness of the 
other subject (see Appendix A).
Procedure
All experimental sessions were conducted by a male 
experimentor. In the initial phase of the experiment,
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subjects were informed that the study was being conducted 
under a grant from the University to study the psycho­
logical ramifications of men working in close proximity 
at intellectually demanding tasks. Subjects were also 
shown two examples of the type of problems which com­
prised the experimental task. They were told that they 
would be required to solve 30 such problems, which would 
be presented via a slide projector, selected from a 
larger battery of similar problems which had been designed 
to measure abstract reasoning and intellectual ability 
of people at the very highest levels of intelligence.
They were also informed that they should not be surprised 
if they failed to get a large number of correct answers 
since the test was specifically constructed to discrim­
inate at the highest levels of intelligence in the 
population.
The E explained that each subject would have the 
opportunity to solve the problems and to act as an ob­
server. The observer's function was described as re­
quiring that the subject "pay attention to what's going 
on".
After the subjects had been familiarized with the 
operation of the consoles and the nature of the experi­
mental task, the E requested one of them to flip a coin 
to determine which of the two would perform the task 
first. The E informed this subject that if the coin came
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up heads he would go first, if tails, the other subject 
would go first. The subject selected to flip the coin 
was determined by his position relative to the E. A 
table of random numbers was employed to determine which 
subject, left or right, would be requested to toss the 
coin. When the first actor had been identified in this 
manner, the E then stated that since A had determined who 
was to attempt the task first, B would draw to determine 
the reward. The drawing was made from a cannister con­
taining six ping pong balls, each marked with a "one" or 
a "three". Subjects were told that they would receive 
either one or three points for performing the experiment 
depending upon which number they drew.
Subjects in the future interaction condition were 
then informed that the cost of the experiment was $100.00 
less than the amount received in the grant from the 
University. Since all the money had to be spent the E 
had decided to allow the subjects the opportunity, at a 
later date, to work as a team in solving another set of 
problems, similar to those to be used in the present 
experimental session, in a competition with other teams 
of subjects who had participated in the experiment. The 
team that solved the most problems in this future competi­
tion would receive the $100.00 to divide between them.
Prior to the actual performance of the experimental 
task the E programmed the consoles so that the responses
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of the subject who served as the first actor would yield 
an ascending or descending pattern of correct answers 
and that of the second actor would result in the opposite 
pattern.
Subjects in the control condition were informed that, 
in accordance with departmental regulations, they would 
receive three points for participating in the experiment. 
Thus these subjects did not draw to determine the reward 
although the E did allow them to decide who would serve 
as the first actor by having one of them toss a coin in 
the same manner as the other subjects. No mention of any 
future competition for the left over $100.00 was made to 
the control subjects.
All subjects, in both control and experimental con­
ditions, were informed that once the experiment began 
there was to be no communication between them until the 
experiment was completed.
Upon completion of the above briefing, subjects were 
given the opportunity to ask for clarification of any 
aspects of the experiment about which they were uncertain. 
When the E was satisfied that the subjects understood 
what was required of them they were seated before their 
respective actor/observer consoles facing the screen upon 
which the experimental problems were to be presented. 
After reminding the actor to answer each problem and 
activating the slide projector which automatically
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presented them the E then stood in the background while 
the subject solved the problems.
When the time required for the presentation of the 
30 problems had elapsed, the E returned and escorted the 
subjects to two separate rooms where they completed the 
questionnaires which served as the dependent measures.
The E told each subject to answer each question and that 
their responses would remain anonymous.
When the subjects had completed the questionnaires 
they switched roles so that the person who had been the 
actor now served as the observer and vice-versa. Once 
the dependent measures were collected for the second run 
the E informed the subjects that the experiment was over. 
They were then thanked for their cooperation and told that 
a group debriefing for all subjects would take place at 
a later date in order to inform them of the findings.
Experimental Design
A multivariate analysis was initially conducted to 
allow a number of ad hoc comparisons to be examined by 
use of individual analyses of variance. The effects of 
the four variables upon the attribution process were then 
further analyzed using a 2 (role-actor or observer) by 2 
(future interaction/no future interaction) by 2 feedback 
patterns of correct responses- ascending or descending) 
by 3 (reward, high, low, standard) factorial design. 
Specific orthogonal comparisons and Duncan’s Multiple
Range tests were then made to test the hypotheses.
RESULTS
A total of 11 dependent variables were analyzed in 
order to investigate the experimental hypotheses. These 
dependent variables assessed the subjects' attributions 
of: 1) responsibility for reward outcomes (See Appendix
A, items 1 and 5), 2) attractiveness of the other
subject (See Appendix A f item 3), 3) ability (See
Appendix A, item 7), 4) effort (See Appendix A, item 11),
5) problem difficulty (See Appendix A, items 8 and 9),
6) performance (See Appendix A, items 2 and 6), and 7) 
the influence of luck on performance (See Appendix A, 
items 4 and 10).
A multivariate analysis of variance was performed to 
determine if there were any overall significant treatment 
effects on the subjects’ attribution processes. This 
analysis, using the Hotelling-Lawley’s Trace criteria, 
indicated an overall main effect for: Future Interaction,
F (11 and 132) = 2.66, p=.004, Feedback F(ll and 132)=8.33, 
p=.001, and Reward, F(ll and 132)=2.73, p=.004. An overall 
Interaction by Reward effect, F (11 and 132)=2.56, p=.006 
and Time by Role effect, F(ll and 132)=1.94, p=.039 were 
also found. Based on the results of the MANOVA, uni­
variate analyses were conducted to determine the in­
fluence of the various experimental treatments on the 
dependent measures.
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The hypothesis (la) that, in situations wherein re­
ward was not manipulated and subjects were not told that 
they would be working together on a similar task in the 
future, actors would tend to make external attributions to 
explain their behavior whereas observers would tend to 
explain that same behavior by making internal disposi­
tional attributions to the actor was not supported. 
Specific Duncan's Multiple Range comparisons for each 
of the nine dependent measures presented in Table 1 
between actors and observers serving in their roles for 
the first time under identical future interaction and re­
ward conditions relevant to this hypothesis, i.e. standard 
reward-no future interaction, indicated no statistically 
significant differences between actors and observers in 
terms of the externality-internality of their attributions.
As a further test of the externality-internality of 
actor/observer attributions a chi square analysis of the 
subjects' perception of problem difficulty fluctuation 
(See Appendix A, item 8) was conducted in order to deter­
mine whether any of the experimental manipulations 
resulted in changes in the subjects' attributions of the
difficulty level of the problems. A significant chi
2
square for feedback (X =54.35, p=.001) indicated that 
subjects, regardless of role, made attributions of 
problem difficulty fluctuation based upon feedback. 
Ascending subjects perceived the first half of the
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TABLE 1
MEAN ATTRIBUTION SCORES OF FIRST ORDER ACTORS AND OBSERVERS 
FOR THE STANDARD REWARD-NO FUTURE INTERACTION CONDITION
dependent measures actors observers
number correct 14.13 14.62
liking for other subject 4.58 4.78
lucky guesses 4.92 5.88
expected number correct 17.06 16.13
ability 4.43 4.63
difficulty of first half 6.67 6.75
difficulty of second half 6.82 6.87
unlucky guesses 7.85 8.83
effort 86.16 87.25
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problems as most difficult while descending subjects con­
sidered the second portion of the problems most difficult. 
The data for this analysis is presented in Table 2. A 
significant feedback by future consequences chi square 
(X2=61.77, p=.0001) indicated that the effect of feedback 
on perception of problem difficulty exerted itself re­
gardless of whether or not subjects anticipated future 
interaction (See Figure 1). The feedback by reward chi
square (X2=65.69, p=.0001) and the feedback by role chi 
2
square (X =66.99, p=.0001) indicated that regardless of 
role or reward received for performing the experiment, 
subjects who received an ascending pattern of feedback 
perceived the first portion of the problems as more 
difficult than the second portion while those who received 
descending feedback perceived problem difficulty in a 
reverse fashion (See Figures 2 and 3). Of the twelve chi 
square analyses performed only those involving feedback 
were significant in terms of altering the subjects' per­
ceptions of problem difficulty. Thus, the determining 
influence upon attributions of problem difficulty was the 
feedback pattern which subjects, regardless of role, 
received.
The hypothesis (lb) that when situational factors 
such as high reward are combined with ascending feedback 
patterns of success, attributions of actors will be more 
internal than when such situational factors are not
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TABLE 2
FREQUENCY OF ASCENDING AND DESCENDING SUBJECTS' 
ATTRIBUTIONS OF PROBLEM DIFFICULTY
attributions ascending descending
of difficulty feedback feedback
most difficult problems
were located in first half 52 12
all problems were of
equal difficulty 23 21
most difficult problems
were located in second half 15 60
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Fig. 1. Feedback x future interaction chi square for 
perception of problem difficulty.
1 = most difficult problems were located in first half 
3 = all problems were of equal difficulty 
5 = most difficult problems were located in second half 
NFI = no future interaction 
FI = future interaction 
ds = descending feedback 
as = ascending feedback
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Fig. 2. Feedback x reward chi square for perception 
of problem difficulty.
1 = most difficult problems were located in first half
3 = all problems were of equal difficulty
5 = most difficult problems were located in second half 
As = ascending feedback
Ds = descending feedback 
LO = low reward 
St = standard reward 
Hi = high reward
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Fig. 3. Feedback x role chi square for perception of 
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5 = most difficult problems were located in second half 
As = ascending feedback 
Ds = descending feedback 
Act = actor 
Obs = observer
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manipulated, was not supported. The mean attribution 
scores of actors in these conditions are presented in 
Table 3. Orthogonal comparisons for each of the nine 
dependent measures shown in Table 3 between attributions 
made by actors in high and standard reward conditions 
under ascending feedback and no future interaction yielded 
no significance for any of the dependent measures.
The hypothesis (Ic) that first and second order 
actors and first and second order observers should 
demonstrate similar attributions under the same experi­
mental conditions was only partially supported. Order, 
i.e. whether a subject was in a particular role first or 
second was identified as exerting a main effect on attri­
butions of performance, i.e. how many problems the subject 
was perceived to have solved correctly (See Appendix A, 
item 2). Thus first order subjects (X=14.38) tended to 
make attributions of poorer performance than did second 
order subjects (X=15.66), F (1,106)=6.70, p=.05. A sig­
nificant order by role interaction, F (1,106)=8.12, p=.01, 
was also obtained for attributions of how well the subject 
would perform if he were given another attempt at a 
different set of similar problems (see Figure 4). An 
orthogonal comparison between observers indicated that the 
first order observers expected the actors to solve fewer 
problems currently on a future attempt (See Appendix A, 
item 6) than did second order observers, F (1, 106)=9.94,
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TABLE 3
ACTOR'S MEAN ATTRIBUTION SCORES UNDER HIGH AND STANDARD 
REWARD FOR ASCENDING FEEDBACK AND NO FUTURE INTERACTION
dependent measures
reward
high standard
number correct 12.4 13.8
liking for 
other subject 4.7 4.6
lucky guesses 3.9 4.9
expected number 
correct 15.2 16.6
ability 4.7 4.1
difficulty of 
first half 7.1 7.0
difficulty of 
second half 5.4 6.8
unlucky guesses 10.4 7.9
effort expended 86.5 84.5
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Time x role interaction for expected future 
performance.
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p=.01. Aside from these exceptions, all other dependent 
measures employed in the study indicated no influence of 
order on the subjects1 attribution processes.
The hypothesis (Ila) that when both subjects inter­
act in producing an outcome (high/low) reward, respon­
sibility for positive outcomes, i.e. high reward, will be 
attributed primarily to oneself by both subjects whereas 
negative, low reward, outcomes will be attributed to the 
other person was not confirmed. Contrary to expectation, 
subjects did not differ significantly in their respon­
sibility attributions as a function of reward on either 
of the two dependent measures (See Appendix A, items 1 
and 5) used to assess attributions of responsibility for 
reward outcomes. Mean attribution scores of subjects in 
high and low reward conditions for responsibility for 
reward outcomes are presented in Table 4.
Although the hypothesis concerning responsibility 
attributions for reward outcomes did not contain any pre­
diction regarding the effects of future interaction on 
the subjects attributions of responsibility, a significant 
main effect F (1,72)=5.20, p=.05, was obtained for the 
influence of future interaction on attributions of 
responsibility for reward outcome than when no future 
interaction was anticipated. A pronounced trend was also 
observed in the data for subjects to attribute more 
responsibility to themselves when a low reward was re­
ceived in the no future interaction condition and to
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TABLE 4
I*
MEAN ATTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY TO SELF AND OTHERS
FOR REWARD OUTCOME
attributions
of
responsibility High
Reward
Low
to self 42.75 50.62
to other
subject 45.13 36.19
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attribute more responsibility to the other subject when a 
high reward was received in the future interaction condi­
tion (See Table 5). It was also found that attribution of 
responsibility for reward outcomes to the other subject 
(See Appendix A, item 5) was positively correlated (p=.01) 
with his expected performance on a future attempt at the 
task (See Appendix A, item 6). That is, the more the 
other subject was seen as responsible for the reward out­
come, the better he was expected to do in a future 
performance of the task.
The hypothesis (IIa2) that both actors and observers 
would make more positive attributions, other than for 
responsibility, under high reward conditions was partially 
supported. It was expected that high reward subjects 
would make attributions of more ability, more effort, 
better performance, and better future performance than 
would subjects who received a low reward. Mean attribu­
tion scores relevant to this hypothesis are presented in 
Table 6. Main effects for reward were obtained for 
attributions of performance (See Appendix A, item 2)
F (2,108)=4.73, p=.05, ability (See Appendix A, item 7)
F (2,108)=3.40, p=.05, good luck, (See Appendix A, item 4)
F (2,108)=7.37, p=.01, and unlucky guesses (See Appendix A, 
item 10) F(2,108)=3.86, p=.05. Thus subjects, regardless 
of role, made attributions of better performance, higher 
ability, more good luck, and more unlucky guesses when
TABLE 5
MEAN ATTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY TO SELF AND OTHERS 
FOR REWARD OUTCOME BY SUBJECTS IN FUTURE INTERACTION 
AND NO FUTURE INTERACTION CONDITIONS
attributions no future interaction future interaction
responsibility high reward low reward high reward low reward
to self 40.50 57.00 45.00 44.25
to other
subject 37.75 32.88 52.50 39.50
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TABLE 6
MEAN ATTRIBUTION SCORES OF SUBJECTS UNDER 
HIGH AND LOW REWARD CONDITIONS
dependent measures
Reward
high low
number correct 15.26 14.15
liking for 
other subject 4.80 4.63
lucky guesses 5.84 4.33
expected number 
correct 17.53 16.80
ability 4.70 4.43
difficulty of 
first half 6.74 6.75
difficulty of 
second half 6.78 6.63
unlucky guesses 9.16 7.28
effort expended 87.81 87.81
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they participated under high reward than when they did 
so under low reward conditions. Although, contrary to 
expectation, no main effect for reward on effort expended 
was obtained, a significant interaction was found between 
reward and future interaction F(2,108)=3.48, p=.05 (See 
Figure 5). Thus when subjects, regardless of role, 
received a low reward they made attributions of greater 
effort, F (1,108)=11.51, p=.01, when they expected to be 
working together as a team competing on a similar task 
for a large financial reward in the future than when they 
did not have this expectation of future interaction. A 
significant reward by future consequences interaction,
F (2,108)=4.26, p=.0 5, was also obtained for attributions 
of unlucky guesses (See Figure 6). An orthogonal compari­
son indicated that subjects, regardless of role, who did 
not anticipate future interaction made attributions of 
significantly fewer unlucky guesses under low reward than 
they did under high reward conditions, F(l,108)=13.49, 
p=.001. On the other hand, subjects who expected future 
interaction did not differ in terms of their attributions 
of unlucky guesses as a function of reward.
The hypothesis (Ilbl) that an ascending pattern of 
success would be perceived by observers as indicative of 
lower ability and poorer performance on the part of the 
actor than similar attributions made by observers 
witnessing a descending pattern of successes was supported
49
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(See Table 7). Orthogonal comparisons were made between 
attributions of observers under descending and ascending 
feedback conditions for all dependent variables presented 
in Table 7. These comparisons indicated that descending 
observers attributed better performance (See Appendix A, 
item 2), F (1,108)=21.6, p=.001, and more ability,
F( 1,108)=12.27, p=.001, to the actors than did ascending 
observers. The descending observers also expected the 
actors to correctly solve more problems on a future 
attempt (See Appendix A, item 6), F(l,108)=10.73, p=.01.
No significant differences were found, however, for the 
observers1 attributions of effort or luck as a function 
of feedback.
Orthogonal comparisons for the six dependent measures 
presented in Table 8 further indicated that when observers 
witnessed a descending pattern of feedback and did not 
expect to interact with the actor in performing a similar 
task at a future time, they attributed better performance, 
i.e. a larger number of correct responses, to the actor, 
F(l,108)=4.61, p=.05, than when they witnessed an ascend­
ing pattern of feedback under the same future interaction 
condition. None of the other five comparisons yielded 
significant differences between attributions of ascending 
and descending observers in the no future interaction 
condition.
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TABLE 3
OBSERVERS' MEAN ATTRIBUTION SCORES UNDER 
ASCENDING AND DESCENDING FEEDBACK
dependent
measures Ascending Descending
number correct 13.72 16.97
lucky guesses 5.55 6.08
expected number correct 16.08 18.75
ability 4.43 4.90
unlucky guesses 9.00 7.53
effort expended 85.67 89.17
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TABLE 8
OBSERVER'S ASCENDING AND DESCENDING MEAN ATTRIBUTION SCORES 
UNDER THE NO FUTURE INTERACTION CONDITION
dependent measures
ascending
feedback
descending
number correct 13.50 15.63
lucky guesses 4.97 5.80
expected number 
correct 15.70 16.80
ability 4.40 4.57
unlucky guesses 8.90 8.80
effort expended 83.83 86.17
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Since a main effect for order was obtained for per­
formance attributions (See Appendix A, item 2), as in­
dicated earlier, ascending observers were compared on the 
basis of order for each of the six reward-interaction 
treatment conditions using the Duncan's Multiple Range 
test. None of these comparisons indicated that performance 
attributions of observers were affected by order since no 
significant differences were obtained.
In order to assess the effects of the feedback 
manipulation on observers in the same way as had been 
done in the earlier Jones, et al. (1968) study, the 
attributions of first order observers under the control 
condition were also compared by means of the Duncan1s 
Multiple Range test for each of the nine dependent 
variables listed in Table 9. In this pure test, observers 
attributed better performance to the descending actors 
than to the ascending actors (Diff=5.8, p=.01) and they 
expected the descending actors to correctly solve more 
problems on a future attempt (See Appendix A, item 6), 
Diff=8.4, p=.01, although they did not attribute more 
ability to the descending actors (See Appendix A, item 7). 
The means relevant to these comparisons are presented in 
Table 9.
The hypothesis (IIb2) that actors experiencing an 
ascending pattern of feedback would attribute higher 
ability and better performance to themselves than actors
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TABLE 9
MEAN ATTRIBUTION SCORES OF FIRST ORDER OBSERVERS UNDER 
ASCENDING AND DESCENDING FEEDBACK IN THE STANDARD 
REWARD-NO FUTURE INTERACTION (CONTROL) CONDITION
dependent measures
ascending
feedback
descending
number correct 13.40 16.70
liking for 
other subject 4.60 5.10
lucky guesses 3.90 5.90
expected number 
correct 14.40 19.50
ability 4.40 4.80
difficulty of 
first half 6.00 6.10
difficulty of 
second half 5.90 7.50
unlucky guesses 7.90 8.80
effort 80.00 87.00
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experiencing a descending pattern of success was not 
supported. Instead, the opposite occurred such that the 
attributions of actors were affected by the feedback in 
the same fashion as were those of observers. Orthogonal 
comparisons were made between attributions of actors 
under descending patterns of feedback across all other 
conditions for the six dependent variables presented in 
Table 10. These comparisons indicated that actors 
witnessing descending patterns of feedback attributed a 
higher degree of ability (See Appendix A, item 7) to 
themselves than did actors who received an ascending 
pattern of feedback, P (1,108)=6.42, p=.05, just as the 
observers had done. The descending actors also favorably 
distorted their performance (See Appendix A, item 2),
F (1,108)=35.51, p=.001, attributed more good luck (See 
Appendix A, item 4) to themselves, F (1,108)=25.06, p=.001, 
and expected to solve more problems correctly on a future 
attempt (See Appendix A, item 6), F(l,108)=4.45, p=.05, 
than did actors who received an ascending pattern of 
feedback.
Like the observers, actors who did not expect to 
interact with the other subject in solving similar prob­
lems at some future time attributed a greater number of 
correct responses to themselves when they experienced 
descending feedback, F (1,108)=11.75, p=.001, although 
they did not perceive themselves as having significantly
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TABLE 10
ACTORS' MEAN ATTRIBUTION SCORES UNDER 
ASCENDING AND DESCENDING FEEDBACK
dependent measures ascending descending
number correct 12.60 16.78
lucky guesses 3.58 6.60
expected number correct 15.85 17.57
ability 4.23 4.57
unlucky guesses 8.77 7.43
effort expended 88.83 86.00
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greater ability under this type of feedback. When such 
descending actors expected to interact with the other 
subject at some future time in solving similar problems 
they not only attributed better performance (See Appendix 
A, item 2) to themselves, F (1,108)=25.10, p=.001, but 
also perceived themselves as making more lucky guesses 
(See Appendix A, item 4), F (1,108)=29.58, p=.001, and as 
possessing greater ability for solving such problems,
F (1,108)=4.44, p=.05 (See Table 11).
The hypothesis (lie) that the prospect of future 
interaction for the purpose of gaining a large financial 
reward would influence observers, motivated by self 
interest, to emphasize situational factors in making 
causal attributions to explain the actors' behavior when 
that behavior was perceived as poor, i.e. under ascending 
feedback and to emphasize internal factors when the actors' 
performances were perceived as positive, i.e. under 
descending feedback, was supported (See Table 12). When 
observers witnessed a descending pattern of feedback and 
expected to interact with the actor at a future time in 
performing a similar task, they not only perceived his 
performance (See Appendix A, item 2) as significantly 
better, F(l,108)=19.41, p=.001, than that of ascending 
actors but also expected the descending actors to get 
significantly more problems correct on their next attempt 
(See Appendix A, item 6), F (1,108)=13.47, p=.001,
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TABLE 11
ACTORS' ASCENDING AND DESCENDING MEAN ATTRIBUTION SCORES 
UNDER FUTURE INTERACTION AND NO FUTURE INTERACTION
dependent
measures
future
ascend
interaction
descend
future
ascend
no
interaction
descend
number
correct 12.60 17.57 12.60 16.00
lucky guesses 3.33 7.97 3.83 5.23
expected 
number correct 16.00 18^27 15.70 16.87
ability 4.20 4.60 4.27 4.53
unlucky guesses 9.33 7.67 8.20 7.20
effort expended 92.83 87.67 84.83 84.33
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TABLE 12
OBSERVER'S ASCENDING AND DESCENDING MEAN ATTRIBUTION 
SCORES UNDER THE FUTURE INTERACTION CONDITION
dependent measures asdending descending
number correct 13.93 18.30
lucky guesses 6.13 6.37
expected number 
correct 16.47 20.70
ability 4.47 5.23
unlucky guesses 9.10 6.27
effort expended 87.50 92.17
perceived them as having greater ability, F (1,108)= 
16.04, p=.001, and attributed significantly fewer un 
lucky guesses (See Appendix A, item 10), F(1,1Q8)=6.
DISCUSSION
Three major findings emerged from the present experi­
ment. The results indicated that when subjects are con­
fronted with novel situations involving tasks with which 
they have had little or no previous experience, their 
attributions will be influenced by a primacy effect, 
regardless of whether they actually performed the task or 
merely observed another's performance.
The second major finding of the present experiment 
was that when a person willingly engages in an activity 
which he knows beforehand may result in negative con­
sequences to himself and he believes that he is capable 
of exerting control over the outcome, he will acknowledge 
responsibility for the negative outcome.
The third major finding was that self interest affects 
the directionality of observer's attributions. When it 
was in the observer's self interest to attribute the 
actor's performance to internal dispositional factors, 
i.e. when the actor received a descending pattern of 
feedback and the observer expected to work with him in 
solving similar problems in the future for a large 
financial reward the actor's behavior was attributed to 
internal factors. When it was not in the observer's self 
interest to attribute the actor's performance to internal 
characteristics, i.e. when the actor received an ascending
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pattern of feedback in the future interaction condition, 
the observers attributed the actor's performance to ex­
ternal factors such as bad luck.
The first major finding of the present experiment was 
derived from the results obtained concerning the effects 
of feedback on attributions of performance and ability 
made by both actors and observers which indicated that a 
primacy effect occurred across roles. Jones, et al.
(1968) reported a primacy effect for observers' attribu­
tions of performance and ability, and a recency effect 
for performance attributions made by actors witnessing 
their own behavior. It is suggested that the primacy 
effect obtained for actors in the present study was a 
function of the fact that the actors in this study, as 
compared to those in the earlier study, had little 
knowledge of their relative ability prior to performing 
the task. In the Jones, et al. (1968) study the observers 
knew that the actors had previously solved five more 
problems than they and the actor subjects were informed 
that they had solved five more problems correctly than 
the observer. In the present experiment such definite 
information was not possessed by either actors or ob­
servers. First order subjects, regardless of role, had no 
information regarding relative ability and performance. 
Second order subjects had only a vague idea based on 
their observations of performance, their own or the other
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subject's, during the first session of problem solving.
As indicated earlier, first order subjects, regardless of 
role, tended to make lower performance attributions than 
did second order subjects. This was apparently due to a 
combination of the information they had about the nature 
of the problems, i.e. they were specifically designed for 
the very brightest people in the population, which had a 
depressor effect on their initial attributions of per­
formance, and the cueing effect of the first questionnaire 
which caused the second order subjects to be more accurate, 
and thereby higher, in their performance attributions.
Hovland has suggested that the nearer one comes to 
achieving primacy in the sense of the first presentation 
of unfamiliar material, the more apt one is to obtain 
primacy effects. In the present study such a situation 
was closely approximated with respect to the subjects1 
expectations of performance prior to actually attempting 
to solve the problems. It is likely, that due to the 
description of the problems, i.e. designed to assess 
intelligence levels of extremely bright people, and the 
instructions: "so don't be concerned if you don't get a
large number correct", the subjects' performance expecta­
tions would be slightly pessimistic. This expectation, 
coupled with a lack of familiarity with problems of this 
type and the absence of any accurate standard of 
comparison for performance, resulted in a situation
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wherein the subjects, regardless of role, were susceptible 
to a primacy effect resulting from the feedback. This is 
particularly so for the "ascending actor" who doesn1t 
expect to do too well, is unfamiliar with this type of 
problem, and who lacks an accurate standard against which 
to compare his performance. Such an actor initially en­
counters a sequence of failures which, as the data 
indicates, exercises a determining influence on his 
attributions of performance.
Extending this line of reasoning as an explanation 
of the obtained primacy effect for performance attribu­
tions of ascending actors, one would expect that first 
order ascending actors would make lower performance 
attributions than second order ascending actors since the 
first order subjects lack even the vague standard of 
comparison which is available to those in the second order. 
A series of comparisons between first and second order 
ascending actors, using Duncan's Multiple Range test, 
indicated that such actors in the standard reward-no 
future interaction condition differed significantly in 
their attributions of performance. The same result was 
obtained when first and second order actors in the low 
reward-no future interaction condition were compared on 
attributions of performance. In both cases the perform­
ance attributions of first order actors were significantly 
lower than those of second order actors. The finding
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that the low reward ascending actors were the only treat­
ment group of ascending actors, in the no future inter­
action condition, other than those in the standard reward 
condition, to demonstrate significantly lower first order 
attributions of performance makes sense insofar as they 
not only lacked a standard of comparison, but also, as a 
function of low reward, had even lower performance ex­
pectations than those in the standard reward condition.
All other comparisons of first and second order ascending 
actors under the same interaction conditions resulted in 
no significant differences between performance attribu­
tions , indicating that other factors, e.g. future inter­
action and/or high reward, were exerting "positive" in­
fluence on first order performance attributions.
Although the finding of a primacy as opposed to a 
recency effect for ascending actors' attributions of 
performance is the opposite of that obtained by Jones, 
et al. (1968), it is consistent with findings reported by 
Langer and Roth (1975). These investigators had actor and 
observer subjects engage in a coin tossing task and 
attempt to predict the results, i.e. heads or tails. 
Subjects either flipped the coin (actors) or watched 
another subject flip the coin (observers) and attempted 
to predict the outcome. Subjects were given the same 
feedback conditions, descending, ascending, or random, 
as had been used in the Jones, et al. (1968) study. As
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in the present study, and unlike the Jones, et al. (1968) 
study, the subjects lacked a standard of performance 
comparison. Langer and Roth (1975) found that both actors 
and observers in the descending condition perceived 
themselves as better at the task, remembered more successes, 
and predicted better performance on future attempts.
These investigators concluded that: "... a skill attribu­
tion is determined early in a sequence of outcomes. After 
the attribution is made, outcomes inconsistent with it are 
not given much weight. An early, fairly consistent 
pattern of successes leads to a skill attribution..." 
(Langer and Roth, 1975, p. 954).
The second major finding of the present experiment 
was based upon the total lack of support for the hypothe­
sis that when both subjects interact in producing an out­
come, responsibility for that outcome will be attributed 
primarily to oneself when the outcome is positive (high 
reward) and to the other subject when the outcome is 
negative (low reward). Subjects1 self attributions of 
responsibility for outcome were not affected by the 
positive or negative nature of that outcome. This finding 
is contrary to the self interest, or "self serving" 
position which maintains that it is ego enhancing to see 
oneself as responsible for pleasant things and ego 
threatening to see oneself as responsible for unpleasant 
things. This self serving hypothesis had been supported
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in a recent experiment by Harris and Harvey (1975, upon 
which the present hypothesis was based. These investi­
gators had subjects decide which of two tasks, concerning 
which they had only ambiguous descriptive information, 
another person would perform at a later time. After the 
decision was made subjects were then given additional in­
formation about the nature of the tasks. Half the 
subjects were led to believe that the task was actually 
very pleasant while others learned that it was extremely 
unpleasant. Subjects in the pleasant condition attributed 
a high amount of responsibility for the decision to them­
selves whereas those in the unpleasant condition attri­
buted a relatively low amount of responsibility to them­
selves .
The different methodology of the present experiment 
with respect to the subject's active involvement in deter­
mining the reward and his prior knowledge regarding the 
foreseeability of the possibility of negative consequences, 
i.e. getting a low reward, provides a ready explanation 
of the results obtained with respect to subjects' attri­
butions of responsibility. Kelley (1967) has proposed 
that a person will take responsibility for negative con­
sequences in situations where he considers himself 
instrumental in having brought them about. According to 
Brehm and Jones (1970) and Cooper (1971) a person will 
accept responsibility for negative consequences when he
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knew of the possibility of such consequences prior to 
making the decision. Such conditions were fulfilled in 
the present experiment. The subjects had prior knowledge 
of the possibility of negative consequences, i.e. drawing 
a "one", and were instrumental in determining the reward.
An investigation of determinants of perceived con­
trol (Wortman, 1975) which employed a method of assigning 
attractive or unattractive consequences that was similar 
to the method of determining reward outcomes in the present 
experiment yielded results which are almost identical to 
those obtained in the present study. Wortman (1975) 
showed subjects eight consumer items which they rated for 
attractiveness. Subjects were then allowed to draw one 
of two different colored marbles from a can in order to 
win one of the two items, the one they had rated most 
attractive and the one they had rated least attractive. 
Subjects were informed before the drawing that if they 
drew a blue marble they would receive a certain item, 
e.g. the one they had rated most attractive, and if they 
drew a red marble they would get the other. In other 
words the subjects had prior knowledge of the possible 
consequences of their action. The finding of importance 
with respect to the present experiment is that the 
subjects who had this prior knowledge did not differ 
significantly in their attributions of responsibility as 
a function of the attractiveness of the outcome. As a
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matter of interest, the low attractive outcome subjects 
tended to attribute more responsibility to themselves, 
although not significantly so, than did those whose 
actions resulted in receipt of the highly attractive out­
come. These results are nearly identical to those ob­
tained in the present experiment in which low reward 
subjects in the no future interaction condition tended to 
attribute more responsibility to themselves than did high 
reward subjects. The reversal of this trend under future 
interaction conditions suggests a motivation on the part 
of the subjects to make a good impression by attributing 
greater responsibility for the positive outcome and less 
responsibility for the negative outcome to the other sub­
ject whom they expect will be their partner in a future 
endeavor. Such a responsibility allocation in the future 
interaction condition is also consistent with the subject1s 
self interest insofar as the correlation between the 
dependent measures of "responsibility of other for out­
come" and expected future performance was highly sig­
nificant in a positive direction. Thus the more subjects 
perceived the other person as responsible for the out­
come, the better they expected him to perform at the task 
in the future. Needless to say, the better their partner 
was expected to do, the better their chances of winning 
the fifty dollar prize. Thus the future interaction con­
dition employed in the present experiment may be con­
sidered to have activated a double edged self interest
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motive, i.e. the desire to be perceived in a positive 
light and the desire to perceive the other person as one 
who would perform successfully when such a performance 
meant financial gain for the attributor.
The third major finding of the experiment was based 
upon the hypothesis that the prospect of future inter­
action for the purpose of gaining a large financial reward 
would influence observers to make internal attributions 
when they perceived the actors ' performances as 1 good" 
and to emphasize external situational factors when they 
perceived the behavior as "poor". This hypothesis was 
supported. When observers who expected future inter­
action with the other subject for monetary gain witnessed 
a performance which they perceived as good, i.e. 
descending feedback, they favorably distorted performance, 
attributed more ability to the actor, and expected him to 
solve more problems correctly on the next attempt than 
when such future interaction observers witnessed a "poor" 
performance, i.e. ascending feedback. Thus it seems that 
the future interaction condition aroused observers' self 
interest which in turn influenced their attributions in 
a manner that increased their chances of winning the 
fifty dollars. Such a conclusion seems further warranted 
by the finding that observers who perceived a positive 
performance in the future interaction condition expected 
the actor to solve more problems correctly on the next
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attempt than did observers who witnessed the same positive 
performance in the no future interaction condition.
The other aspect of this hypothesis was that when 
future interaction observers perceived a poor performance, 
i.e. ascending feedback, they would emphasize situational 
factors to explain that performance. This portion of the 
hypothesis was also supported. Observers in the future 
interaction condition who witnessed an actor receive an 
ascending pattern of feedback attributed the actor's 
"poor” performance to bad luck. Thus the interpretation 
was that the actor1s performance was not due to a lack 
of ability, but rather to an external factor, bad luck.
The observer's self interest apparently was served since 
the actor, the observer's future partner, was not lacking 
in ability at the task, he merely was unlucky on his 
first attempt at the task.
The results of the present experiment also suggested 
that when their self interest was not involved, observers 
witnessing another person performing a task require some 
standard of comparison to serve as a basis for attributing 
ability at that task to the other person. In the absence 
of such a standard, observers who are requested to make 
attributions regarding the performer's ability at the 
task will tend to make moderate rather than extreme 
ability attributions.
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This suggested interpretation was based upon the 
results obtained from tests of several of the experimental 
hypotheses. The hypothesis that under standard reward-no 
future interaction conditions actors would explain their 
behavior by external attributions whereas observers would 
explain this same behavior by internal dispositional 
attributions was not supported. This hypothesis was 
based upon the theoretical position of Jones and Nisbett 
(1972) which maintains that "...there is a pervasive 
tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situa­
tional factors whereas observers tend to attribute them 
to stable personal dispositions" (p. 80). Results con­
sistent with this position have been reported by Jones 
and Harris (1967) with respect to observers attributions 
of essay writers' attitudes and by Jones, et al. (1968) 
for causal attributions of performance on a difficult 
intellectual task.
The standard reward-no future interaction condition 
of the present experiment was intended as a replication 
of the earlier Jones, et al. (1968) experiment insofar 
as the nature of the task, patterns of feedback, and 
subjects' anticipation of future interaction for the 
possibility of gaining a financial reward were essentially 
identical in both experiments. Jones, et al. (1968) 
found that observer subjects in the descending success 
conditions rated their actors as more intelligent than
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they did actors in the ascending feedback condition. The 
observers also predicted that the descending actors would 
perform better on a future similar task and favorably 
distorted recall of the descending actors9 performances.
In their sixth experiment of the series, Jones, et al. 
(1968) again had a subject and a confederate simultaneously 
solve the problems. This time, however, the subjects 
learned that the accomplice had correctly solved ten of 
the thirty items whereas he had solved 15 items in either 
a random, ascending, or descending pattern of success.
The subjects in this case predicted better future per­
formance for themselves when they received an ascending 
as opposed to a random or descending pattern of feedback. 
Ascending subjects also reported that the items in the 
latter portion of the series were of less difficulty than 
those in the initial portion. Conversely, subjects who 
received descending feedback indicated that the latter 
items were more difficult than the initial ones.
Based on the findings of the Jones, et al. (1968) 
study it was predicted that in the present experiment 
comparisons of actor and observer attributions under the 
standard reward-no future interaction condition should 
yield differences in the directionality of attributions. 
Actors should, it was hypothesized, make external situa­
tional attributions to explain the same behavior under the 
same conditions. Thus comparisons were made between the
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attributions of actors and those of observers in the 
standard reward, no future interaction condition to test 
this hypothesis. No significant differences were found 
between the attributions of actors and observers under 
these conditions and thus the hypothesis was not supported.
It is important to note that the results reported by 
Jones et al. (1968) with respect to the divergent attribu­
tions of actors and observers were based on a series of 
six experiments in which comparisons were never directly 
made between the attributions of actors and observers. 
Instead, the first five experiments compared observers' 
attributions under ascending feedback against observers' 
attributions under descending feedback.
When these same comparisons, i.e. observers under 
ascending feedback versus observers under descending 
feedback, were made using a Duncan's multiple Range test, 
in the standard reward-no future interaction condition of 
the present experiment, descending observers favorably 
distorted the actor's performance and expected that the 
actor would get more correct on a future attempt than did 
ascending observers, although they did not attribute more 
ability to the descending actors.
One other aspect of the Jones, et al. (1968) experi­
ment seems worthy of mention at this point. In the first 
five experiments of the earlier study both subjects, one 
of whom was a confederate, simultaneously performed the
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problem solving task, after which the observer subjects 
were informed that the other "subject” had solved 15 of 
the 30 problems correctly and that they had correctly 
solved only ten of the problems. Thus, a standard of 
comparison was established, i.e. the observer subjects 
believed that the other person had correctly answered 
five more problems, roughly 17% of the total number, than 
they had. The observer subjects than attributed more 
ability and better future performance to descending than 
to ascending "subjects". They also favorably distorted 
their recall of the number of correct responses made by 
descending "subjects".
As was indicated earlier, a significant main effect 
for order was obtained for the dependent measure "How 
many problems did the other subject solve correctly?" and 
a significant order by role interaction was found for "How 
many problems would you expect the other subject to answer 
correctly if he had the opportunity to take another test 
composed of similar items of comparable difficulty?" In 
the present experiment subjects did not simultaneously 
respond to the problems. Instead, one served as an ob­
server while the other solved the problems. First order 
subjects therefore had no information upon which to form 
a personal standard of comparison as did the subjects in 
the Jones, et al. (1968) study. All that first order
subjects knew was that the problems had been developed
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for the express purpose of assessing intelligence in the 
highest intellectual segment of the population. Thus 
while the descending feedback pattern had essentially the 
same effect on attributions of first order observer sub­
jects in the present experiment as it did in the Jones, 
et al. (1968) study, i.e. under descending feedback ob­
servers favorably distorted performance and expected the 
actor to perform better on a future attempt, it did not 
affect their attributions of ability.
Despite the fact that they favorably distorted his 
performance under descending feedback and expected better 
future performance for descending than for ascending 
actors, first order observers were apparently unable to 
interpret the meaning of the actors * scores in terms of a 
relative level of ability since they had no standard against 
which to make a comparison. Thus it is suggested that 
attributions of ability require some standard against 
which performance can be measured. According to Jones 
and Nisbett (1972) the observer compares the actor with 
other actors and judges his attributes accordingly. In 
the present experiment, first order observers in the 
standard reward-no future interaction lacked such a 
standard by which to assess the actor's ability.
Technically, second order observers had such a 
standard of comparison in the sense that they were aware 
of both their own performance and that of the second
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order actor. However, it is logical to conclude that, by 
virtue of having completed the initial questionnaire, the 
second order observers had been cued to attend to the 
number of correct responses made by the second order 
actor. This assumption is supported by the fact that 
first order observers * mean attributions of the actors' 
performances differed by +3.2 for the descending feedback 
and by -2.6 for ascending feedback whereas second order 
observers differed by only +.2 for descending feedback 
and by -.6 for ascending feedback from the actual number 
of correct responses, which was 15 in both feedback con­
ditions. This cueing reduced the influence of feedback 
patterns on atrributions of performance, since second 
order observers attended more closely to the number of 
correct responses, and by virtue of the high positive 
correlation (p=.0001) between performance and expected 
future performance eradicated the difference obtained in 
the first order attributions.
Another finding which suggested the importance of 
the social comparison factor was the result obtained 
from testing the hypothesis that actors who received an 
ascending pattern of feedback would attribute higher 
ability and better performance to themselves than actors 
who received a descending pattern of success. This 
hypothesis was not supported. All subjects regardless of 
role made attributions of better performance and higher
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ability under descending feedback conditions. Although 
the overall results indicated that feedback exerted a 
positive influence on attributions of ability, it is of 
interest that under the no future interaction conditions, 
actors attributed better performance to themselves under 
descending feedback although they did not differ in 
attributions of ability or expected future performance as 
a function of feedback. When they anticipated future 
interaction with the other subject for the purpose of ob­
taining a large financial reward, however, descending 
actors favorably distorted their performance, perceived 
themselves as making more lucky guesses, and considered 
themselves to have more ability at the task than did 
ascending actors. The fact that the descending actors 
made more favorable attributions under the future inter­
action condition appears to be a function of self 
interest. The more ability and good luck they possess, 
the better is their chance to win the money.
The suggested importance of the social comparison 
process was also based on the results obtained for the 
hypothesis that an ascending pattern of success would be 
perceived by observers as indicative of lower ability and 
poorer performance on the part of the actor than similar 
attributions made by observers witnessing a descending 
pattern of successes. This hypothesis was supported. 
Overall, observers witnessing a descending pattern of
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feedback attributed significantly higher ability to the 
actor than did observers witnessing an ascending pattern 
of feedback. When observers witnessed a descending 
pattern of correct responses and did not anticipate 
fixture interaction with the actor they attributed better 
performance to him than when, under the same expectation 
of future interaction, they witnessed an ascending pattern 
of successes. This finding is consistent with the results 
reported by Jones, et al. (1968). However, this com­
parison yielded no significant difference in attribu­
tions of ability. The finding tha- under no future inter­
action feedback did not affect observers' attributions of 
ability may be explained by the observer's lack of a 
standard of comparison. Unlike the Jones, et al. (1968) 
study, observers had no exact information regarding the 
relationship between level of ability and number of 
correct responses. They only knew that the questions had 
been designed to test the intelligence of the brightest 
people in the population. Since a score could not be 
translated into a level of ability the most accurate 
attributions of ability, given the information possessed 
by the observers, was "about average". The fact that the 
mean attribution scores of ability made by observers were 
4.9 under descending feedback and 4.43 under ascending 
feedback, where a score of four to five was "average 
ability", may be interpreted as support for this position.
81
The fact that when observers expected to interact 
with the actor in the future for the purpose of obtaining 
a financial reward they not only perceived a descending 
actor as having more ability, but also favorably distorted 
his performance, attributed fewer unlucky guesses to him, 
and expected him to get more problems correct on the next 
attempt than they did for an ascending actor can be 
interpreted in terms of self interest. Simply put, the 
"better" one's partner, the better one's chances of 
winning the prize money.
Two additional hypotheses were investigated in the 
present experiment. These predictions dealt with the in­
fluence which rewards and order would exert on the 
subjects' attribution processes. In each instance partial 
support was obtained for these hypotheses.
The hypothesis that both actors and observers would 
make more positive attributions, other than for respon­
sibility, under high reward conditions was partially con­
firmed . High reward subjects, regardless of role, made 
attributions of better performance, higher ability, and 
more good luck than did low reward subjects. This finding 
was consistent with the results reported by Apsler and 
Friedman (1975) and Lerner (1965). The only dependent 
variable not affected by the reward manipulation was the 
subjects' ratings of "liking" for the other subject. No 
significant differences were obtained for this measure
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under any of the treatment conditions. This is contrary 
to what might be expected, based on the findings of Apsler 
and Friedman (1975). However, in their study observers 
were informed that the actors had been ambiguously assig­
ned a high or a low reward. The reward which the observer 
received was not manipulated. Observers in the Apsler 
and Friedman (1975) study perceived the actor as less 
"good" under the low reward condition. In the present 
study, however, both actors and observers received the same 
rewards.
Walster (1966) has proposed that the tendency for an 
observer to attribute responsibility to victims of 
suffering is due to the reassurance the observer gains 
from this type of "defensive" attribution. Unless ob­
servers hold such victims responsible for their unhappy 
states, suggests Walster, they must face the possibility 
that similar occurrences could happen to them. In the 
present experiment it was expected that low reward subjects 
would be more disliked than would standard or high reward 
subjects. It is suggested that the reason why subjects in 
the low reward conditions of the present experiment were 
not "disliked" is that both received the low reward. In 
Walster's terminology, they were not in a position to 
make "defensive" attributions because the same "unhappy" 
fate had happened to them.
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Partial support was also obtained for the hypothesis 
that order would not affect the attributions of subjects.
A main effect for order, i.e. whether a subject served 
in a certain role first or second was obtained for attri­
butions of performance. First order subjects tended to 
make lower attributions of performance than did second 
order subjects. It is suggested that during the first 
session of problem solving neither subject was paying 
strict attention to the number of correct responses made. 
Actors were involved in arriving at solutions to the 
problems and making responses, whereas observers were also 
concentrating on solving the problems, although they made 
no responses, since they knew that their turn would be 
next to use the apparatus and respond to the problems.
When the first problem solving session was completed both 
subjects filled out the questionnaire before switching 
roles and beginning the second session. The questionnaire 
undoubtedly cued the subjects to attend to the number of 
problems correctly solved, thus accounting for the main 
effect which order had for this dependent variable. The 
fact that first order subjects made lower performance 
attributions than second order subjects may be accounted 
for by the information they had received about the nature 
of the problems. Prior to beginning the experiment, sub­
jects were told that the problems had been deve.loped 
specifically for discriminating among intelligence levels
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of the brightest people in the population. They were 
further advised not to be concerned if they didn’t get a 
large number of the problems correct. This information, 
coupled with the fact that during the first problem 
solving session they had not specifically attended to the 
number of correct responses, resulted in the lower first 
order performance attributions obtained.
A significant order by role interaction was obtained 
for attributions of expected future performance. While 
actors, regardless of order, expected to get about the 
same number of problems correct on a future attempt 
(X^=17.06, X2=16.35), second order observers expected 
better future performance (X=18.7) than did first order 
observers (X=16.13). This order effect for observers was 
significant at the .01 level of confidence.
The explanation for this interaction seems to lie 
in the nature of the tasks performed by subjects in the 
actor and observer roles. The actors had to attend to 
the problems as they were presented on the screen, 
formulate solutions, and respond by pressing the approp­
riate button. Actors also had to be sure that the 
correct toggle switch, corresponding to the problem on 
the screen, was depressed. This necessity for having the 
appropriate toggle switch depressed was emphasized in the 
pre-experimental instructions. The observers, on the 
other hand, were merely instructed to "watch what's
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going on". They also viewed the problems on the screen 
and received feedback, visual and audio, via a console on 
their desk. As has been previously stated, all subjects 
made lower attributions of performance after the first 
session than they did after the second session. The 
initial completion of the questionnaire undoubtedly cued 
both actors and observers to attend more closely to the 
number of problems solved correctly. Due to the more 
complex nature of the actor’s tasks, however, this cueing 
effect exercised less influence on their attention to the 
number of problems they solved correctly. They had too 
many other things to do and consequently had less con­
fidence than the observers in recalling their actual 
performance.
It is suggested that the order by role interaction 
obtained for expected future performance is a function of 
the differential cueing effect described above. The 
better one perceives another’s performance, the better he 
will expect the person to do on a future attempt at the 
same task. That this was the case in the present experi­
ment is demonstrated by the high positive correlation 
(p=.0001) between attributions of performance and those 
of expected future performance. Thus second order actors, 
because of this lack of confidence in the accuracy of 
their performance recall, were more conservative in 
predicting their future performance. The observers, on
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the other hand, having more confidence in their second 
order attributions of performance predicted that the 
actor would make more correct responses on his future 
attempt.
In summary, the present experiment revealed that the 
situational variables of reward, role, future expectations, 
and feedback of success were capable of altering the 
subjects1 attribution processes in a number of ways. The 
results indicated the general influence of a primacy 
effect for feedback upon the attribution processes of 
both actors and observers involved in the experimental 
task. It was also found that when subjects willingly 
engage in an activity which they realize may result in a 
negative consequence and feel that they have been in­
strumental in determining this outcome they will acknowl­
edge their responsibility for this negative consequence. 
The results also indicate that the attribution process 
was influenced by the self interest of the attributor.
The externality-internality of observer subjects was 
affected by their self interest. Performance was attri­
buted either to internal characteristics or to external 
factors as a function of the observer's self interest.
In terms of the divergent attribution hypothesis 
(Jones and Nisbett, 1972) the findings of the present 
experiment suggest that for certain types of attribu­
tions, e.g. ability at a particular task, some standard
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of comparison is utilized by both actors and observers.
As Jones and Nisbett (1972) have suggested, the actor 
compares his actions in a particular situation to his 
previous actions in similar situations, i.e. his relevant 
past history, whereas the observer compares the actions of 
a particular actor to those of other actors. The present 
experiment indicates that certain situations, as a func­
tion of their novelty, may provide no standars of social 
comparison upon which to base ability attributions and 
thereby result in the elimination of role as a factor in 
the attribution process. The results further suggest 
that certain situational variables, such as reward and 
self interest, affect the attribution processes of both 
actors and observers in a similar manner.
The findings of the present research may have some 
practical implications with respect to various types of 
educational programs. For example, the results of the 
present research may be applied to programs which seek to 
impart work skills to the underprivi1edged in industrial 
ability. In such training situations it may often be 
that the trainees attribute relatively low levels of 
ability to themselves and that this type of self attribu­
tion may act as a "self fulfilling prophecy" which 
seriously reduces the benefits of such training. The 
results obtained in the present experiment suggest that 
the learning tasks might be structured and presented in
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a manner that results in an initial series of successes 
as a method of overcoming these initially negative self 
attributions. The results further suggest that the self 
interest motive of the trainees should be activated, 
whenever possible, in a manner whereby the participants 
perceive the situation as one in which it is in their 
best interest to succeed at the tasks. Short term in­
centives such as weekly team and/or individual competi­
tions for rewards which the participants value may be an 
effective means of accomplishing this. The experimental 
results also suggest that the subjects should be allowed 
some control over the situation. Take as an example, a 
work skills training program which offers instruction in 
several areas, e.g. truck driver, assistant machinist, 
fork lift driver, and lathe operator. Upon entry to such 
a program the person could be informed of both the positive 
and negative aspects of each area of instruction, e.g. 
although assistant machinists earn more money, the 
training is longer and most people find it more difficult 
than the other courses of instruction. The person, having 
this prior knowledge of the potential negative aspects of 
his decision, could then be allowed to select a program.
An orientation could further emphasize that the situation 
is one over which his actions determine the outcomes.
It is suggested that by combining the above factors 
of initial success, self interest, and the feelings of
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control over the situation the number of people success­
fully completing such training programs could be sub­
stantially increased. At the present time such thinking 
must be termed speculation, yet it seems a promising area 
in which to apply our laboratory derived knowledge of 
factors affecting the attribution process.
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APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIRES
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1. In terms of percentage, to what extent were you
responsible for the fact that you and the other sub­
ject received the highest/lowest possible payment 
for participating in the experiment?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. How many of the problems did you solve correctly?
i 1 i -JL
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
3. What is your reaction to the other subject in this
experiment?
dislike like
very dislike like very
much dislike somewhat neutral somewhat like much
! i 1_____1___ -I—  I..I 1
4. How many of your correct answers were the result of 
lucky guesses?
10 15 20 25 30
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5. In terms of percentage, to what extent was the other 
subject responsible for the fact that you and he 
received the highest/lowest possible payment for 
participating in the experiment?
I I I l I I I I !_____ 1_____!____ I
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. How many problems would you expect to answer correctly
if you had the opportunity to take another test 
composed of similar items of comparable difficulty?
I 1 _ I . — I----------
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
7. What level of ability, relative to the population
of college students here at LSU, did you demonstrate 
in solving the abstract reasoning problems used in 
the experiment?
very well somewhat somewhat well very
low below below above above high
ability average average average average average ability
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8. Which statement do you feel best describes the series 
of problems used in this study?
 The first portion of the series contained the
most difficult problems.
 Item difficulty was arranged in the order of
four difficult to one easy problem.
 All problems were of approximately equal
difficulty.
 Item difficulty was arranged in the order of
four easy to one difficult problem.
 The second portion of the series contained the
most difficult problems1.
9. On a scale of one to ten, where l=extremely easy and 
10=extremely difficult, rate the level of difficulty 
of items: (A) 1 through 15 and (B) items 16 through 
30.
(A) Items one through fifteen:
I— I___ i I i i  i i i i I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
(B) Items sixteen through thirty:
!
I i i i i i i j i i__
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
10. How many of your incorrect answers were the result 
of unlucky guesses?
1- a i t I I t I l | I I \ I 1 I i 1 I 1 I I I 1 I LI I I 1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
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11. In terms of percentage of effort expended, how hard 
did you try to correctly answer the problems?
J  l i » » 1 t l t 1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
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1. In terms of percentage, to what extent were you
responsible for the fact that you and the other sub­
ject received the highest/lowest payment possible for 
participating in the experiment?
1 i i I I____ I— l— I— I— I— I— I
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2. How many problems did the other subject solve 
correctly?
I 1 I I L  I 1
5 10 15 20 25 30
3. What is your raction to the other subject in this 
experiment?
dislike like
very dislike like very
much dislike somewhat neutral somewhat like much
4. How many of the other subject's correct answers were 
the result of lucky guesses?
1 I I 1_________ !_________
5 10 15 20 25 30
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5. In terms of percentage, to what extent was the other 
subject responsible for the fact that you and he 
received the highest/lowest possible payment for 
participating in the experiment?
 I I I I 1_____ ! I I I I I
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
6. How many problems would you expect the other subject 
to answer correctly if he had the opportunity to 
take another test composed of similar items of 
comparable difficulty?
I I I 1 I I I
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
7. What level of ability, relative to the population of 
college students here at LSU, did the other subject 
demonstrate in solving the abstract reasoning prob­
lems used in the experiment?
very well somewhat somewhat well very
low below below above above high
ability average average average average average ability
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8. Which statement do you feel best describes the series 
of problems used in this study?
 The first portion of the series contained the
most difficult problems.
 Item difficulty was arranged in the order of
four difficult to one easy problem.
All problems were of approximately equal 
difficulty.
 Item difficulty was arranged in the order of
four easy to one difficult problem.
  The second portion of the series contained the
most difficult problems.
9. On a scale of one to ten, where l=extremely easy and 
10=extremely difficult, rate the level of difficulty 
of items (A) one through fifteen and (B) items six­
teen through thirty.
(A) Items one through fifteen:
I i i i  !__1__I__I__1— I— I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
(B) Items sixteen through thirty:
Li ! I i I I I J 1 I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
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10. How many of the other subject's incorrect answers
were the result of unlucky guesses?
11. In terms of percentage of effort expended, how
hard did the other subject try to correctly answer 
the problems?
I i i i____ i___ i '_____ i___ i_____ i_____ I
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
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1. How many of the problems did you solve correctly?
I 1.1 1 1 1 1 I 1 I I » I > S I I 1 I lit I i I JLJlL_L J
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
2. What is your reaction to the other subject in this 
experiment?
dislike like
very dislike like very
much dislike somewhat neutral somewhat like much
1 I i i . i i l l
3. How many of your correct answers were the result of 
lucky guesses?
l i t  % i 1 t i i > 1 i I I t 1 I I » I 1 I I \ l 1 1 V i I I
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
4. How many problems would you expect to answer
correctly if you had the opportunity to take another 
test composed of similar items of comparable 
difficulty?
L 1 I t  1,J , i l l  I L I  1 » \ \ i 1_LI » I 1 i_l I 1—
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
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5. What level of ability, relative to the population of 
college students here at LSU, did you demonstrate in 
solving the abstract reasoning problems used in the 
experiment?
very well somewhat somewhat well very
low below below above above high
ability average average average average average ability
6. On a scale of one to ten, where l=extremely easy and 
10=extremely difficult, rate the level of difficulty 
of items: (A) 1 through 15 and (B) items 16 through
30
(A) Items one through fifteen:
I I i i I i I l I i I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
(B) Items sixteen through thirty:
Li 1 I I i l  I I l I
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 9  10
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7. Which statement do you feel best describes the series 
of problems used in this study?
The first portion of the series contained the 
most difficult problems.
Item difficulty was arranged in the order of 
'four difficult to one easy problem.
All problems were of approximately equal 
'difficulty.
Item difficulty was arranged in the order of 
four easy to one difficult problem.
The second portion of the series contained the 
most difficult problems 4
8. How many of your incorrect answers were the result of 
unlucky guesses?
1— 1— 1____ 1____ 1____ 1____ 1____ 1____ 1 1 1 I
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
9. In terms of percentage of effort expended, how hard 
did you try to solve the problems correctly?
1 I 1 I I I I I I 1_____!______ I
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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1. How many of the problems did the other subject solve 
correctly?
1 I H  » | I t \ t—Li i..i i — I i i . I l. » i„,.a
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
2. What is your reaction to the other subject in this 
experiment?
dislike like
very dislike like very
much dislike somewhat neutral somewhat like much
3. How many of the other subject's correct answers were 
the result of lucky guesses?
Li » i i Li—i—i— i— l__i —i & i I t i l i I i i i | i I i i i 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
4. How many problems would you expect the other subject 
to answer correctly if he had the opportunity to take 
another tefet composed of similar items of comparable 
difficulty?
.1, » 8 I 1 > > » ■ I < t I 8 1 I > _i j \  J I I
5 10 15 20 25 30
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5. What level of ability, relative to the population of 
college students here at LSU, did the other subject 
demonstrate in solving the abstract reasoning prob­
lems used in the experiment?
very well somewhat somewhat well very
low below below above above high
ability average average average average average ability
6. On a scale of one to ten, where l=extremely easy and 
10=extremely difficult, rate the level of difficulty 
of items: (A) 1 through 15 and (B) items 16 through
30.
(A) Items one through fifteen:
1— i— I__ i I i i i t i 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
(B) Items sixteen through thirty:
1----- 1------- 1------1------- 1------ 1------ L____I I I !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
107
7. Which statement do you feel best describes the series 
of problems used in this study?
The first portion of the series contained the 
most difficult problems.
 Item difficulty was arranged in the order of
four difficult to one easy problem.
All problems were of approximately equal 
difficulty.
Item difficulty was arranged in the order of 
four easy to one difficult problem.
 The second portion of the series contained the
most difficult problems.
8. How many of the other subject's incorrect answers 
were the result of unlucky guesses?
» » I t i lii \ t 1 t i * « l r I I i I i l i « 1 I i |— |—
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
9. In terms of percentage of effort expended, how hard 
did the other subject^try to solve the problems 
correctly?
I i i i i I i i i i i 1
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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